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This study aims to understand the nature of the structural change in the Korean labor 
market by analyzing the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms 
between 1982 and 2004. The result reveals that Korea experienced two historical moments 
in which the size-wage gap surged: one in 1987, the year of mass labor strikes spurred by the 
democratization movement, and the other in 1997, the year the Asian financial crisis began. 
Whereas the first moment was a temporary phenomenon lasting only until the early 1990s, 
the second moment led to a continuous wage-gap increase. The result of an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition of the wage gap shows that the factors contributing to the widening of the 
wage gap since the economic crisis were different between the manual sector and the non-
manual sector. For manual workers, the increase of the size-wage gap was mostly induced 
by compositional effects, specifically the increased share of long-tenured workers in large 
firms. For non-manual workers, however, it was a price effect. In light of the current debate 
on the transformation of the internal labor market, we conclude that a corporate internal 
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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
The internal labor market is a distinctive employment system in which 
employees are protected from the external market competition through 
organizational institutions such as the internal promotion ladder and the 
seniority wage system. Although the internal labor market may be a mutually 
beneficial system for both employers and employees in gaining employees’ 
commitment and loyalty for the former and in ensuring security of 
employment and wages for the latter, it also contributes to creating a gap and 
inequality between those who are inside the system and  those who are not.  
Despite differing opinions about the Korean internal labor market, there is 
a general consensus that watershed moments in the structural transformation 
of the labor market occurred in 1987 and 1997.1 1987, the year of the first 
national general strike, is most commonly recognized as the year when the 
labor market segmentation started to develop in Korea, as argued by Song 
(1994) and supported by   numerous studies to evidence the development 
of the internal labor market in large companies and the core-periphery 
segmentation (Lee 2001; Nahm 1995). on the other hand, after the economic 
crisis in 1997, there have been growing arguments  claiming that the Korean 
internal labor market had been dissipated by the neo-liberal structural 
changes triggered by the economic crisis (Roh 2008). Massive layoffs and 
restructuring done in almost all chaebol companies immediately after the 
economic crisis were interpreted as signs of the dismantling of the internal 
labor market even in large enterprises. 
However, despite changes in the hiring processes and changes in the 
personnel management practices of large firms during the late 1990s, there 
remains no systematic understanding of how the labor market changed as a 
whole. In addition, the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) has continually increased since the economic crisis 
(Jung and cheon 2001) and a significant portion of the wage disparity that 
1 Refer to Hwang (2007) for an opposing view. Hwang asserted that the internal labor 
market experienced a structural change to temporary workers during the mid-1980s 
through his analysis of the trends of temporary workers from 1970 to 2005. 
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has surged since 1997 can be attributed to the pay difference between large 
firms and SMEs (Jung 2002; Kim and Han 2007). Such reports illustrate 
the difficulty in answering the simple question: “Are Korean internal labor 
markets weakening?” If large conglomerates’ internal labor markets were 
weakened after the economic crisis and this led to an organized shutdown 
of wage premiums, then why has the size-wage gaps been increasing? This 
contradiction provides us with the starting point of conjecture on how the 
Korean labor market changed after the economic crisis. 
Since the late 1990s, two main points of view have emerged concerning 
the structural change of the labor markets. First, there is the opinion that the 
internal labor market retained its original identity but was simply reduced 
in size. The second view asserts that the labor market itself has dissolved. 
The former assessment may be found in research by Hwang (2003). Hwang 
utilized the 1998-2003 data from the Korean Labor and Income Panel Study 
(KLIPS) to analyze the standard for wage determination for insiders (large 
firms, permanent employees, and union members) as well as outsiders (small 
to medium-sized firms, temporary workers and non-union workers). She 
found a significant difference in wage determination between the insiders and 
the outsiders; personal attributes such as  education and tenure being more 
important to insiders and job attributes such as industry or occupationbeing 
more significant to outsiders., and argued thateven after the economic crisis, 
the divide in the labor market continued to exist. She further argues that the 
large conglomerate companies of Korea responded to the economic crisis 
not by functional flexibilization strategy but by quantitative flexibilization 
strategy, outsourcing workers at the lowest levels of the organization of 
production. As a consequence, the labor market was in a way reduced, but 
Hwang believes that the essence of the market remained.2
Ryoo (2002), who used the same data as Hwang, asserts that the internal 
labor market is weakening, as demonstrated by the sharp erosion of the male 
2 This assertion also matches Eom(2006)’s analysis of a large firm’s personnel 
documents. He analyzed the 1996-2000 personnel documents of a large firm that 
had adopted a performance-based pay system in 1998 and found that controlling 
for age, the effect of firm tenure had rather increased after the company adopted the 
performance-based pay. Based on this case study, he argues, it is hard to conclude that 
the adoption of performance pay system weakens the seniority effect.  
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employees’ seniority pay. In addition, Ryoo and Park (2003) utilizing“Wage 
Structure Survey” to analyze the wage determining mechanisms of male 
workers between 1980 and 1999, found that the importance of seniority pay, 
which rewards firm-specific skills has lost its dominance in overall wage 
determination process after  the early 1990s , whereas the influence of the pay 
for work experience (not firm tenure), which signals the reward for general 
skills universally applicable across firm boundaries has continued to increase 
since the early 1990s.
Reflecting such different opinions, Jung and cheon (2001) recognized 
the existence of two macro trends sending contradictory signals with respect 
to the fate of the Korean internal labor market: the growing size-wage gap 
implicating the strengthening of the internal labor market and the waning of 
seniority wage, and concluded that the corporate internal labor markets “still 
persists protecting its incumbents from the market competition, yet at the 
same time pushing them into severe internal competition.” 
These studies, both recognized for their validity, reached such different 
conclusions mainly due to the data used, the scope conditions, and the 
methods of analyses, though other factors were involved as well. In particular, 
the manner of composing the target analysis groups differentiates the 
conclusions of these studies. If the ways in which the internal labor market 
changed had been different across sub-groups , then analyzing the whole 
group without recognizing the internal variation would create an error close 
to an omitted variable bias.  In particular, considering that a company’s 
employment restructuring strategies are adjustable in accordance with 
production skills and bargaining power of unions it is a grave mistake to 
analyze changes in the internal labor markets without differentiating between 
two inherently different groups, that is the manual group in which firm-
specific skills are still important and the union membership is relatively high 
and the nonmanual group in which specificity of skills is low and the union 
rate is low.
This essay aims to analyze the size-wage gap between large and small to 
medium-sized Korean firms between 1982 and 2004 and within the context 
of change in the internal labor market structure. Through the process of 
analyzing the mechanisms that created the disparity, we hope to understand 
the changing form of the Korean labor market. The result of our study reveals 
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that  the wage gap between large firms and SMEs surged once in 1987 and 
again in 1997. The first instance was a temporary phenomenon but the second 
instance instigated a continuing wage-gap increase. The result of an oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition of the wage gap shows that the factors contributing 
to the widening of the wage gap since the economic crisis differ between the 
manual sector and the non-manual sector. Possibly, it is these differences that 
created the inconsistent conclusions in the previous studies related to the 
changes in the internal labor market.
II.  DIFFERENcE IN coMPoSITIoN oR coMPENSATIoN: 
THE SoURcE oF THE SIzE-WAgE gAP
The internal labor market is commonly defined as a closed employment 
system protected from  market competition, but there is a certain variation in 
the heuristic tools that researchers use to identify the existence of the internal 
labor market. For example, Althauser and Kalleberg (1981), influenced by 
neo-institutional economics arguing that organizations are created in order 
to minimize transaction costs in the process of production distinguish the 
restriction of entry to the organization, the job ladder, and the internal 
promotions as defining characteristics of the internal labor market. Thus, 
workers’ wage growth through internal upward movement  is seen as the 
main indicator of the internal labor market. on the other hand, for the 
Korean labor market, in which the system of wages based on job titles is 
underdeveloped, Jung (1992; 2001) and Nahm (1995) define the internal 
labor market in the broad sense as workplace customs in which “practices 
differentiated from external markets” exist and adopted the comparatively 
high wage and job security as its indicators (for further information, refer to 
Jung and cheon 2001: 157-163).
In this case, where is the Korean internal labor market located and in what 
form? It is known that factors such as the industry, the size of the firm, and 
the type of occupation have been suggested as the basis of the division of the 
labor market at theoretically and empirically. given that the outcome of the 
debate depends upon how the internal labor market is defined, the dispute 
is expected to continue. However, if relatively higher wage and employment 
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security are commonly used to defines internal labor market,  we can use the 
size difference between large and small-to-medium firms as proxy variable 
demarcating the boundary of labor market segmentation Research based 
on an analysis of micro-data asserts that, in Korea, internal corporate labor 
markets form around large firms. This research cites the presence of a size-
wage gap, difference in wage determination, seniority wages  in large firms, 
and the limited relationship between large firms and small to medium-sized 
firms as evidence (Yee 2003; Hwang 2003). In this study, we will follow Jung 
and cheon (2001) and use the size of the firm as the proxy variable of the 
internal labor market divide, but we will also analyze how the causes of the 
size-wage gap changed and focus on the changing aspects of the macro labor 
market.3
The phenomenon of large firm workers earning higher wages than their 
counterparts at small to medium-sized firms can be found in many countries. 
Studies have observed companies with more than 500 workers and companies 
with less than 100 workers and compared their respective wage disparities, 
finding a gap of 17% (Main and Reily 1993) in great Britain and 19% in 
the United States (Idson and Feaster 1990). When the company size was 
increased to more than 1000 workers and decreased to less than 30 workers, 
the disparity grew to 54% in the United States and 49% in Japan (oi 1990: 
S127-S128).
owing to the tendency of average wages to be greater at large firms than 
at small to medium-sized firms, it appears rational to accept such a difference 
as a self-evident truth. However, there are many reasons and explanations 
about why such differences occur. As discussed by Brown and Medoff (1989), 
the size-wage gap could be established from the personnel structures of 
the respective firms or could exist even after accounting for the personnel 
3 Because the discussion about the internal labor market is intensive and broad, it is 
important in this study to define the internal labor market as the internal corporate 
labor market. Therefore, the findings of this study cannot be applied to other forms 
of the internal labor market. The defining characteristics of this sort of market are 
high wages, restriction of entry, promotion ladders and organizational isolation. For 
the purposes of this study, the focus will be upon economic compensation. Also, 
it is important to stress that in order to infer the internal corporate labor market’s 
changing form, consistent reservations need to be taken into account. 
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structures.
The size-wage gap could arise from both compositional differences and 
price differences. As for the former, there are several reasons to believe that 
the higher mean wage of the large firms is because of their compositional 
characteristics. First, large firms are comparatively  more concentrated 
in manufacturing industries, while the small to medium-sized firms are 
primarily concentrated in service industries. Therefore, in this instance, it 
can be inferred that the wage disparity is due to the fact that medium firms 
have a high concentration of low paying service jobs. Second, there could 
be differences in the job distribution as well. Because large firms have a 
comparatively greater number of higher-paying corporate jobs, the average 
wage may be higher. Third, in the same context, in larger firms, workers with 
more education are distributed throughout, adding to the wage gap. Fourth, 
there are comparatively more workers with longergreater firm tenure in large 
firms  thus increasing the difference in wages. In addition, workers with 
unobserved qualities that favorably increase wages may be more concentrated 
in  larger firms and thus contribute to the higher average wages.
Apart from the compositional difference, large firms and SMEs may 
pay differently for the same human capital and this price difference may 
contribute to the size-wage gap. groshen (1991) summarizes various 
theoretical explanations on why larger firms may pay more for the same 
personal attribute as follows. 
1. workers in larger firms may have greater unobserved productivity 
2.  workers in large firms may have to endure more unfavorable working 
conditions such as inflexible working hours and harder disciplinary 
requirements, hence are more compensated. 
3.  The costs to monitor a person’s work may be higher in large firms hence 
managers may pay greater effective wages to induce more loyalty. 
4.  Both the ability of the employer to compensate workers and the workers’ 
ability to negotiate may be higher in large firms.
All of the explanations are grounded in theories that are somewhat 
contradictory to one another, but here we simply recognize that there are 
many different reasons as to why the price differential between larger firms 
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and smaller firms can arise.
If the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms 
increases, it could be a result of strengthened compositional differences 
between the two or a result of increased price differentials. When this logic is 
applied to the Korean internal corporate labor market, two scenarios emerge.
First, if Korean large firms clung to the internal labor market policies 
and responded to business fluctuations caused by the economic crisis by 
dismissing the peripheral workforce with short firm tenure while protecting 
the core long-tenured workforce, large firms would have experienced 
homogenization in workforce after the economic crisis particularly in 
terms of tenure distribution and the compositional difference between the 
large firms and SMEs would have increased. In this case, the increase of the 
size-wage gap after the economic crisis can be understood as a result of a 
reinforced selection of employees in large firms. That is, it can be understood 
as a result of the increased mean wage of large firms as the proportion of 
workers with long firm tenure increased. 
on the other hand, had the collapse of seniority wage and employment 
system been predominant as a consequence of large firms renouncing the 
internal labor market policy, then the difference in personnel attributes 
between the large firms and SMEs would have been reduced. Particularly, 
long-tenured employees in large firms, who are more costly to maintain, 
would have been let go and forced retirement would have increased. Suppose 
that the compositional differences between the large firms and SMEs have 
been significantly reduced as a result of such change in large firms. If the 
size-wage gap had increased during the period in spite of the convergence of 
distributional characteristics, it will be hard to regard that the increase of the 
size-wage gap was induced by a compositional change.  
III. DATA AND METHoD oF DATA ANALYSIS
This research utilized the 1982–2004 data sets from the “Basic Survey of Wage 
Structure” The “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” is data from the Ministry 
of Labor that tracks businesses with more than 10 employees, excluding 
public administrations, national organizations, and housework services. The 
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sampling scope is expanded to businesses with five or more employees since 
1999, but to maintain the compatibility over time, samples are restricted to 
firms with ten or more workers throughout the whole period. Although there 
are differences every year, there are usually about 5,000 business organizations 
and over 300,000 workers included in the original data. Research from these 
data typically uses a sample of 5% or 10%. This study, however, utilized the 
entire sample. The extraction rate of the workers varied with the size of the 
company. Therefore, in order to account for differing extraction rates, the 
sampling weights are applied.
The “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” has an advantage of having a large 
survey pool. Moreover, it contains highly credible information. However, the 
“ten or more workers” criterion is not a trivial limitation hence should be 
taken into account when interpreting the results. 
To identify and quantify the separate contributions of group differences 
in terms of measurable characteristics, the oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
technique was used (oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973). The average wages between 
the two groups is different possibly because the personnel compositions 
are different or because the compensation for the same human attribute is 
different. The oaxaca-Blinder decomposition a method to distinguish the 
effects of compositional difference and the price difference on the average 
wage differential between two groups. It relies on a counterfactual calculation 
of how much wage gap would be reduced had the distribution of human 
capital of the low-wage group been the same as that of the high-wage group 
or had the price for the same attribute is the same between two groups. Here, 
the proportion of compositional effect to account the total wage gap is called 
the explained proportion of the wage gap while the proportion of price effect 
to account the wage gap is called the unexplained proportion of the gap.4
Suppose there are two groups with different average wages. The wage 
equations for the higher-paying group (H) and lower-paying group (L) can 
4 consider a scenario in which the wage was wholly determined by education and 
where the average level of education for a high-wage organization was comparatively 
high. If after the calculation the effect of education is evident in both organizations, 
then the wage gap between the two organizations could be wholly explained 
by education. However, if the education effect only increases in the high wage 
organization, then one cannot explain the wage gap solely in terms of education. 
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be expressed as below. Here, βH refers to the coefficient vector of the higher 
wage group including the Y-intercept, XH refers to the vector of human capital 
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According to  the oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, the average 
difference of wages between the groups can be separated into the difference in 
the average personnel attributes  and the difference in average compensation 
coefficients. If we set  the high-wage (H) group’s earning function as the 
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 (D: Wage Differentials) = (E: structural effect) + (c: cost effect) + (cE: 
interaction effect)
 
The first term, βH(X
—H – X
—L), represents the difference in composition between 
the  the two groups, called the endowment effect or the composition effect. 
The second term, XL(βH – βL), represents the difference in the compensation 
coefficient, called the coefficient effect or  the price effect as well. The last 
term, the combination (βH – βL)(XH – XL), represents the interaction effect. 
The average wage differential of the two groups, labeled D, is the sum of the 
endowmentl effect (E), the cost effect (C) and the interaction effect (CE), 
hence the ratio of each item to D shows the relative contribution of each effect 
on the wage gap. 
In this study, a large firm is defined as a corporation with more than 300 
workers, and small to medium-sized firms are defined as companies with 
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fewer than 300 workers. The independent variables in wage determination are 
education, age, age-squared, firm tenure, firm tenure squared,  marital status, 
industry, and occupation. The dependent variables are the logarithm of the 
hourly wage. The hourly wage is the real hourly wage adjusted for inflation 
using the consumer price index (the reference year is 2000)provided by 
the Bank of Korea. To maintain compatibility over time, the industry was 
recoded following  the fifth standard industry classification scheme and 
the occupation was recoded following the  the third standard occupation 
classification scheme. The sample is limited to male workers. In order to 
understand the structural change of the internal labor market, it is important 
to note difference in genders; however, because this study is focused on wage 
disparity, it seemed best to restrict the subjects to male workers.
IV.  THE TREND oF THE SIzE-WAgE gAP AND cHANgES 
IN THE coMPoSITIoNAL DIFFERENcE BETWEEN 
LARgE FIRMS AND SMES: 1982-2004
First, we investigate how the wage gap between large firms and SMEs has 
changed over the last 25 years. <Figure 1> shows the trend of  the logged real 
hourly wage in large firms and SMEs from 1982 to 2004 by sex. The wage gap 
between large firms and SMEs appears to have experienced two historical 
surges. Among male workers, the size-wage gap increased sharply after 1987, 
then became stabilized until it encountered another surge right after 1997, 
the year of economic crisis. More specifically, in 1987,  male workers at large 
firms earned, on average, 12% more than male workers at small to medium-
sized firms, but the gap surged to 22% in the following year. 
It appears that the increase in the size-wage gap in 1987 was due to 
the increased bargaining power of workers in large firms due to rapid 
organization of trade unions in large firms followed by mass labor strikes 
concentrated in  the heavy manufacturing-chemical industry. However, the 
effect of 1987 was temporary and lasted only five years. Such alleviation of the 
size-wage gap can be a result of  subsequent pay raises in SMEs trickled down 
from the remarkable pay increase in the larger firm. After the early 1990s, the 
wage gap was alleviated, but after the financial crisis of 1997, the gap widened 
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significantly to the extent that in 2004, the average hourly wage of workers 
at large firms was 130% greater than workers at SMEs. The case was similar 
for females, but compared to males, the premiums for working at large firms 
were smaller and, therefore, the wage gaps in the two momentous years were 
not as defining as the wage gap for males.
If the temporary discrepancy of male workers after 1987 is ignored, then 
the continually increasing gap among male workers can be said to have 
started after the economic crisis of 1997. Accordingly, it appears as though 
the compositional characteristics of  male workers in large firms and in SMEs 
became more and more heterogeneous. If the distributions of workers in large 
firms and SMEs had increased over the years, it will be reasonable to examine 
changes in compositional difference first for the cause of the increase of size-
wage gap. 
The Index of Dissimilarity is an index to measure the compositional 
difference between two groups. The index of dissimilarity can be interpreted 
as the percentage of group B that would have to move to group A in order to 
produce a completely even distribution, when 0 indicates perfect evenness 
Figure 1. Trend in Wage gap between Large Firms and Small to Medium-sized Firms.
Log of w
age per hour and net pay difference 
Male
Female
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and 1 indicates perfect segregation. If large firms are labeled as A and SMEs 
are labeled as B and a qualification, such as level of education, is labeled as j, 
then N(A) refers to the number of workers of large firms and N(B) refers to 
the number of  workers of small to medium-sized firms. N(Aj) refers to the 
workers pertaining to the j-characteristic in large firms and N(Bj) refers to the 
workers pertaining to the j-characteristic in SMEs. The level of dissimilarity 
between A and B can be calculated  by the value of D in the following 
equation.
1
( ) ( )1=




N A N B
D
N A N B=
−∑
<Figure 2> shows how the heterogeneity between large firms and small to 
medium-sized firms has changed during the past 25 years for male workers. 
To calculate the level of heterogeneity, the characteristics of the level of 
education, age, years of service, and occupation were used. The level of 
education was divided into four levels (graduation from elementary school, 
graduation from middle school, graduation from high school, and graduation 
from college); age was divided into five levels (under 25 years, 25-35, 35-45, 
45-55, and over 55 years); years of service was grouped into six categories 
(less than 1 year, 1-2, 3-5, 5-7, 7-12, and more than 12 years); and occupation 
was designated into eight categories (manager, specialist, assistant specialist, 
clerical work, selling, technician, assembly, and manual labor).
As <Figure 2> indicates, there were no significant differences in education, 
age, or occupation in large firms and small to medium-sized firms and there 
was no distinct pattern noted regarding any change detected after 1982. 
However, regarding the years of firm tenure, there was a major difference, 
especially after 1997. The index of dissimilarity for male workers was about 
0.24 in 1887 but increased to 0.35 in 2004. In other words, it took 24% of 
workers in SMEs to move out of their tenure group in order to match the 
tenure distribution of the large firms in case of 1987, but it took 35% of 
workers to do so in 2004, indicating an increased compositional difference 
between the two groups during the period.  
The real average years of tenure at large firms and small to medium-sized 
firms can be observed in <Figure 3>. For male workers at medium-sized 








Figure 2. changes in compositional Dissimilarity between  Large Firms and Small to 
Medium-Sized Firms.
Figure 3. change in the Average Tenure in Large Firms and Small to Medium-Sized 
Firms.
Average Tenure (Years) 
Males at Large Firm Males at Small to Medium-Sized Firm
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firms, there has been little change in the last 25 years. Workers in 1982 had 
worked an average of 3.7 years, and in 2004 workers at their companies had 
worked for an average of 5.75 years. conversely, in large firms, the average 
years worked in 1982 was 4.39 years, but by 2004 the average rose to 10.38 
years. The increase in years worked could possibly be a result of the aging 
working class, but the significant difference between the large firms and small 
to medium-sized firms indicates a phenomena independent of demographic 
changes. During the same time period, the average age of the workers at large 
firms increased from 32.11 to 38.99 while for small to medium-sized firms it 
increased from 33.1 to 40.46. Yet the change inthe index of dissimilarity for 
age distribution was miniscule (from 0.1 to 0.15) (refer to <Supplement 1>).
over the last twenty years, large firms and SMEs have maintained similar 
make-ups in terms of the education, occupation, and age of their respective 
workers. However, the increasing gap in the average tenure is evident. In the 
case of male workers, the gap in employment stability between large firms 
and SMEs has continually widened. As a result, the two have become very 
different groups in terms of the proportion of long-tenured workers.
V.  DEcoMPoSITIoN oF THE SIzE-WAgE gAP:  
AN ENDoWMENT EFFEcT oR A PRIcE EFFEcT?
<Figure 4> shows the result of the oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the 
difference in the logged average real hourly wage between large firms and 
SMEs from 1983 to 2004, restricted to male workers.5 The <Figure 4> shows 
the absolute contributions of the endowment effect and the price effect on 
the size-wage gap presented in <Figure 1>. The relative contributions of the 
endowment effect and the price effect can be calculated by setting the wage 
gap of the particular year to 100, and are presented in <Supplement 2>.
The most striking finding in <Figure 4> is that it was the price effect that 
induced the short-term increase in the wage gap between large firms and 
SMEs after 1987. For example in 1986, the mean logged hourly wage of large 
5 Presented is the result setting large firms as the reference group. We duplicated the 
result setting SMEs as the reference and no noteworthy difference was found. 
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firms was 8.204, as compared to the average wage of 8.055 at SMEs. In the 
wage gap of 0.149, 0.047 was due to the price effect. Three years later in 1989, 
the wage gap between large firms and small to medium-sized firms increased 
to 0.24, and of that 0.24, the price effect was an astounding 0.134. The price 
effect, a result of large firms paying more for the same human attributes 
accounted about 31% of the size-wage gap in 1987 but it grew to 56% in 1989. 
Note that the increase of size-wage gap led by the price effect did not last for 
a long time. As the temporary surge of the price effect declined,  the wage gap 
between large firms and SMEs in the early 1990s fell to the levels before 1987. 
one may speculate that the falling price effect is a consequence of a process in 
which the salary increase first initiated in large firms in 1987 slowly trickled 
down to SMEs.
on the other hand, the increase of the size-wage gap in 1997 seems to 
have been caused by a more complex effect. The endowment effect was 
maintained without great changes throughout the 1990s until it encountered 
with a sudden increase in 2000, while the price effect steadily increased after 
1997. considering an analysis of only <Figure 5>, it would appear that the 
wage disparity after the economic crisis was a combination of the structural 





Figure 4. Results of Decomposition of Size-Wage gap: 1983-2004.
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Figure 5. Decomposition of the Size-Wage gap by occupation.
Endowment effectSize-Wage gap
Price effect
             White-collar Worker
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economic crisis and the structural effect responsible afterwards. However, 
this interpretation is an erroneous one that can easily come about when the 
third variable is not properly controlled for. A different pattern is detected 
if blue-collar and white-collar workers are divided and the wage gap is then 
analyzed. 
<Figure 5> presents the result of the oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
applied to the manual and nonmanual male workers separately. First, in the 
case of non-manual workers, the wage gap between large firms and SMEs 
surged after 1987 but continually decreased; in 1996, the gap was measured 
at about 5%. However, after 1997, the gap increased at an alarming rate. The 
contribution of the endowment effect is on the low side. There are indications 
of an increasing trend, but not to the point that it is unsettling. Therefore, in 
the case of white-collar workers, there is not a significant difference in the 
qualifications of workers between large firms and SMEs. correspondingly, the 
qualifications of workers do not contribute significantly to wage disparity. The 
increase of the size-wage gap among nonmanual workers has been mainly 
induced by the price effect, both the  temporary surge after 1987 and after the 
economic crisis. 
For blue-collar manual workers, the endowment effect overrides the 
price effect. Although the price effect seems to have contributed greatly to 
the temporary surge of the size-wage gap in 1987, it is the endowment effect 
that supersedes the price effect throughout the whole period in size and 
responsible solely  for the increase in the wage gap after the late 1990s. 
It is important to note that the increasing price effect led to a temporary 
surge of the wage gap in 1987 for both white- and blue-collar workers. 
However, after 1997, the reason for the wage gap was notably different. After 
the economic crisis, the change in the compositional dissimilarity of white-
collar workers in large firms and SMEs was slow and it was particularly 
the different rates of compensation given to similar qualifications that 
contributed mostly to the wage gap. For blue-collar workers, the increase in 
the heterogeneity between workers in large firms and workers in SMEs was 
the leading cause of the increasing size-wage gap. 
Why are there such great differences in patterns between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers? In the next section, these changes will be compared for 
the year immediately before the economic crisis, 1996, and in the latest year 
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for which we have data, 2004.
VI.  THE SIzE-WAgE gAP DEcoMPoSITIoN FoR MANUAL 
AND NoNMANUAL WoRKERS
The previous trend analysis has shown that the economic crisis of 1997 
increased the size-wage gap but in different way for manual workers and 
nonmanual workers. More specifically it was the endowment effect for 
manual workers and the price effect for nonmanual workers that led the 
increase of the wage gap since 1997. To further investigate the cause of such 
divergence, in this chapter, we apply an oLS regression analysis of the logged 
hourly wage in 1996 and 2004 and compare the results. 
The wage equation used in this chapter is an expansion of the basic 
model used in the previous chapter (experience, tenure, education, marital 
status, and occupation), which also factors in personal traits that could affect 
economic compensation, such as rank, licenses/certificates, form of pay, and 
union membership.6
Experience was calculated as the period between the person’s last graduation 
and the present - 5 years (age – years of education – 5), rank was divided 
into eight categories (board member, head of department, deputy head of 
department, section chief, deputy section chief, head of team, group leader, 
and worker), license/certificates was applied to technicians and other skills 
provided by the state in which people with licenses were labeled 1 and 
workers without were labeled 0. Form of pay referred to hourly pay, weekly 
pay, monthly pay, yearly pay, or pay-by-job (hourly pay is the reference 
category). Finally, in terms of union membership, a 1 was given to workers 
who worked in companies with unions, while laborers working in places 
without unions were given a 0.
<Table 1> presents the result of oLS regression on logged hourly wage 
for manual workers. The chart helps determine which traits are favorable for 
6 This expanded model may be more desirable to estimate wage determination 
mechanisms but many of the variables are not provided in earlier data of Basic Survey 
of Wage Structure, making the longitudinal analysis in the previous chapter cannot 
but rely on the basic model. 









coefficient Average coefficient Average coefficient Average coefficient Average
Education 0.01** 10.8 0.02** 11.36 0 11.72 0.02** 11.88
Job Experience 0.018** 22.48 0.018** 19.53 0.025** 25.35 0.011** 23.42
Job Experience2 -0.00** 675.16 -0.00** 483.43 -0.00** 816.3 -0.00** 662.39
Tenure 0.02** 3.85 0.03** 8.6 0.02** 4.95 0.04** 10.47
Tenure2 0 33.33 -0.00** 115.73 -0.00** 49.17 -0.00** 169.47
Married 0.10** 0.73 0.05** 0.76 0.06** 0.73 0.03** 0.77
Technician 0.19** 0.3 0.16** 0.39 0.29** 0.26 0.26** 0.27
Assembly 
Worker
0.11** 0.55 0.15** 0.54 0.26** 0.52 0.23** 0.6
Board Member 0.12** 0.002 -0.23** 0.001 0.10** 0.007 0.16* 0
Head of 
Department
0.12** 0.003 0.16** 0.001 0.25** 0.019 0.53** 0.001
Deputy Depart-
ment Head 
0.24** 0.013 0.22** 0.008 0.39** 0.016 0.31** 0.004
Section chief 0.12** 0.012 0.04** 0.006 0.27** 0.048 0.29** 0.019
Deputy Section 
chief
0.15* 0 -0.09* 0.001 0.19** 0.082 0.17** 0.076
Team Lead 0.08** 0.012 -0.02** 0.019 0.09** 0.081 0.06** 0.09
group Leader 0.10** 0.033 0.01* 0.033 0.04** 0.034 -0.02** 0.074
License 0.02** 0.36 0.03** 0.36 0.01 0.31 0.03** 0.31
Daily/Weekly Pay -0.01 0.2 -0.07** 0.23 0 0.11 -0.06** 0.18
Monthly Pay 0.14** 0.6 0.07** 0.51 0.05** 0.62 0.06** 0.52
Yearly Pay 0.49** 0 0.19** 0 0.01 0 0.41** 0
Efficiency Pay 0.36** 0.01 0 0 0.21** 0.13 0.28** 0.09
Labor Union -0.13** 0.33 -0.02** 0.84 0.04** 0.22 0.09** 0.79
constant 8.05** 7.98** 8.04** 7.87**
No. of cases 65312 75466 49391 61032
R2 0.23 0.43 0.39 0.56
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wages, how each trait is distributed and how it is valued  in large firms and in 
SMEs. For example,  education acts favorably in determining wages in both 
large firms and SMEs, but the coefficient of education is greater in large firm 
and so is the mean level of education, leading to a conclusion that education 
is a factor to increase the size-wage gap through both the endowment effect 
and the price effect. 
The most striking revelation of <Table 1> is that tenure is a positive trait 
for higher wages in both large firms and small to medium-sized firms. In 
1996, if other qualifications were equal, one additional year of tenure would 
increase the wage by 2% for workers in SMEs and by 3% for workers in large 
firms. The effect of tenure was always greater in larger firms, but in 2004 the 
difference grew greater. Even in 1996, the average years of tenure at  large 
firms was 8.6 years while it was 3.85 years at SMEs meaning a difference of 
4.75 years. However, by 2004 the average time at a large firm was 10.47 years 
whereas it was only 4.95 years at a SME, resulting in a greater difference of 5.52 
years. The relative increase in the proportion of the long-tenured workers in 
large firms  helped widen the size-wage gap.
The rank, occupation, licenses/certificates, and form of pay factors 
between 1996 and 2004 appear to have remained steady in large firms and 
in SMEs in terms of distribution as well as compensation. There was no 
specific attribute, regardless of its direction of influence, disproportionately 
concentrated in large firms or SMEs. No significant change was found either 
between 1996 and 2004. 
However, union membership yielded interesting results. In 1996, 33% of 
workers at SMEs worked at companies with unions, while 84% of workers 
from large firms worked at companies with unions. However, it appears the 
union membership  actually affects wages negatively and that the unfavorable 
effects were greater in SMEs. Nonetheless, in 2004, the effect of union 
membership became favorable and the favorable effects were greater in large 
firms. Union membership actually decreased in large firms and in small to 
medium-sized firms, by 5% and 11%, respectively. In summary, although 
union membership showed a decrease, the effect of union membership 
became favorable. Thus, the structural effect and cost effect both contributed 
to the comparative average wage increase of large firms.
To summarize the result for manual workers, the main cause of the 
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increase in size-wage gap between 1996 and 2004 is the change in the tenure 
distribution between large firms and SMEs and the change in the union effect. 
Not only did the years of tenure increase between 1996 and 2004, but also the 
amount of compensation increased greatly for large firms. Moreover, although 
the level of union membership decreased for all, the rate of decrease was 
slower in large firms widening the gap in union rate between the two groups. 
Also, the union effect on wage was more favorable in large firms. Succeeding 
the conclusion from the previous chapter noting the greater contribution of 
the endowment effect for manual workers, the result shows that it was the 
tenure and the union membership to take the lion share of the endowment 
effect. The disproportionate increase in tenure as well as the increasing return 
to tenure in large firms  illustrates that the internal labor market policies still 
thrives in large firms. In addition, the increasing gap in union rate as well as 
its effect between large firms and SMEs implicates that  the presence of union 
is closely related with  the workings of the internal labor market. 
<Table 2> shows the regression results on the logged real hourly wage of 
nonmanual workers in  large firms and in small to medium-sized firms in 
1996 and 2004. As with blue-collared workers, the  tenure of white-collared 
workers in large firms increased at a faster rate (from 8.1 years to 10.34 years) 
compared to SMEs (from 5.77 years to 6.38 years), however, the return to the 
tenure has rather decreased in large firms. For white-collared workers, the 
return to the labor market experience  was much greater and grew faster in 
large firms. In 1996, the return to experience and tenure were nearly identical 
for large firms and SMEs, but in 2004 , the return to experience decreased 
in SMEs whereas it was the return to tenure that decreased in large firms, 
together adding more to the price differentials between the two groups. 
Another interesting finding is that the proportion of merit-based pay 
within the salary system increased significantly in both large firms and SMEs 
and so did its coefficient. The increase in merit-based pay among non-manual 
workers and the direction of its effect on the size-wage gap should be closely 
examined. Also the increased coefficient of the licenses/certificates should be 
considered in the same vein. 
The effect of unions has changed with a similar pattern to that for manual 
laborers. The positive effect of unions on wages increased after the economic 
crisis, but union rate, especially in small to medium-sized firms, declined 




sized Firm Large Firm
Small to medium-
sized Firm Large Firm
coefficient Average coefficient Average coefficient Average coefficient Average
Education 0.05** 13.97 0.06** 14.48 0.05** 14.31 0.06** 14.74
Job Experience 0.04** 17.57 0.04** 15.41 0.03** 19.86 0.04** 18.49
Job Experience2 -0.00** 412.29 -0.00** 307.76 -0.00** 500.74 -0.00** 411.22
Tenure 0.02** 5.77 0.02** 8.1 0.02** 6.38 0.01** 10.34
Tenure2 -0.00** 70.34 -0.00** 111.97 -0.00** 78.54 0 164.49
Married 0.09** 0.75 0.04** 0.74 0.04** 0.73 0.05** 0.74
Administrative 0.22** 0.14 0.24** 0.05 0.41** 0.14 0.54** 0.06
Professional 0.10** 0.19 0.07** 0.24 0.24** 0.15 0.31** 0.15
Semi-Professional 0.09** 0.201 0.05** 0.249 0.26** 0.318 0.23** 0.342
clerical -0.06** 0.418 -0.03** 0.419 0.21** 0.34 0.20** 0.38
Board Member 0.02 0.098 -0.09* 0.013 0.11** 0.152 0.11** 0.021
Head of 
Department
-0.18** 0.072 -0.02 0.038 0.03** 0.122 -0.06** 0.071
Deputy Depart-
ment Head 
0.03 0.123 -0.08** 0.134 0.01 0.085 0 0.098
Section chief 0.01 0.034 -0.03** 0.029 -0.07** 0.161 -0.04** 0.197
Deputy Section 
chief
0.16** 0.001 -0.04** 0.001 -0.05* 0.17 -0.04** 0.239
Team Lead 0.28** 0 0.26** 0 0.16** 0.03 0.24** 0.04
group Leader 0.58** 0 0.47** 0 0.47** 0.02 0.11** 0.02
License 0.07 0.24 0.02 0.23 0.38** 0.3 0.48** 0.21
Daily/Weekly Pay 0.02** 0.01 -0.01** 0.01 0.07** 0.01 0.04** 0.01
Monthly Pay 0.23** 0.96 0.22** 0.96 0.21** 0.64 0.12** 0.63
Yearly Pay 0.16** 0.03 0.19** 0.02 0.30** 0 0.33** 0
Efficiency Pay 0.08** 0 0.11** 0 0.11** 0.35 0.16** 0.34
Labor Union -0.02** 0.232 0.06** 0.722 0.08** 0.162 0.11** 0.714
constant 7.35** 7.21** 7.44** 7.35**
No. of cases 69864 96072 61965 99365
R2 0.53 0.55 0.45 0.52
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significantly. Such a pattern hints that the endowment effects of unions, after 
the economic crisis, contribute to increasing  the average size-wage gap.
To sum up the result for nonmanual workers, it seems clear that the 
difference in compensation for work experience has led to the wage disparity 
between large firms and SMEs. The decrease of the return to firm tenure 
in large companies denotes the collapse of the internal promotion ladder, a 
core institution of the corporate internal labor market, and the emergence 
of a new form of career often called the “boundaryless career” trajectory in 
which workers move freely across the firm boundary to build up general 
skills rather than firm-specific skills. In addition, the increased return to 
certificates/licenses particularly in large firms and the increased proportion of 
merit-based pay in large firms, all are read as symptoms of the demise of the 
seniority-based organizational career trajectory and the rise of a new more 
individualized career. 
The results of the oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the size-wage gap 
for manual and nonmanual workers are shown in <Table 3> and <Table 4>, 
respectively.
In <Table 3> which is for manual workers, the first row  demonstrates the 
degree to which the determinants of wage contribute to the total endowment 
effect summed at the end of the row. The (+) sign indicates the factor 
contribute to increasing the wage of large firms relative to SMEs thereby 
increasing the size-wage gap  and the (–) sign indicates the opposite. If the 
effect is 0, this indicates that the factor does not explain the wage gap between 
large firms and SMEs. The second row shows the price effect, and the third 
row shows the interaction effect. The result for 2004 is presented alongside 
for comparison. Among manual workers, the average size-wage gap in 1996 
was 16.7%, in which 3.5% was accounted for by the endowment effect. In 
addition, 3.3% was due to the price effect and 9.9% was due to an interaction 
effect. If the wage gap of 1996 is considered to be 100, 21% of the gap was 
due to personnel differences between large firms and small to medium-sized 
firms. In 2004, the endowment effect explained almost 62% of the size-wage 
gap. What could have influenced the endowment effect this significantly?
In 1996, it is the tenure that contributed the most to the endowment 
effect working in favor of large firms, however it is offset by the large (-) 
effect of unions, yielding the total endowment effect as small as +3.5%. 















(E) (c) (cE) (E) (c) (cE)
Education 0.40% 10.00% 0.50% 0.00% 26.00% 0.40%
Job Experience -5.50% -1.80% 0.20% -4.90% -36.40% 2.80%
Job Experience2 6.80% 2.10% -0.60% 9.10% 22.90% -4.30%
Tenure 8.60% 5.90% 7.30% 13.60% 9.50% 10.60%
Tenure2 -0.10% -1.50% -3.70% -3.70% -1.60% -3.80%
Married 0.30% -3.60% -0.20% 0.20% -2.40% -0.10%
Technician 1.60% -0.80% -0.20% 0.10% -0.90% 0.00%
Assembly Worker -0.10% 2.20% 0.00% 1.80% -1.30% -0.20%
Board Member 0.00% -0.10% 0.00% -0.10% 0.00% 0.00%
Head of Department 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.40% 0.50% -0.50%
Deputy Department 
Head 
-0.10% 0.00% 0.00% -0.50% -0.10% 0.10%
Section chief -0.10% -0.10% 0.00% -0.80% 0.10% -0.10%
Deputy Section chief 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.10% -0.20% 0.00%
Team Lead 0.10% -0.10% -0.10% 0.10% -0.30% 0.00%
group Leader 0.00% -0.30% 0.00% 0.20% -0.20% -0.20%
License 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.00% 0.70% 0.00%
Daily/Weekly Pay 0.00% -1.30% -0.10% 0.00% -0.60% -0.40%
Monthly Pay -1.20% -4.40% 0.70% -0.50% 1.10% -0.20%
Yearly Pay -0.10% -0.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00%
Efficiency Pay -0.20% -0.20% 0.20% -0.70% 0.90% -0.30%
Labor Union -6.80% 3.60% 5.70% 2.10% 1.20% 3.00%
constant 0.00% -6.60% 0.00% 0.00% -16.50% 0.00%
Total 3.50% 3.30% 9.90% 15.50% 2.80% 6.70%
Large/Small & Medium Firms Wage gap (T)=E+c+cE
Wage difference between large and 
small-medium firms(T)
16.70% 25%
% Total (T=100) 100 100
% Explained (E/T) 21 62
% Unexplained ((c+cE)/T) 79 38















(E) (c) (cE) (E) (c) (cE)
Education 2.70% 14.60% 0.50% 2.20% 7.80% 0.20%
Job Experience -8.50% 8.30% -1.00% -4.20% 19.50% -1.30%
Job Experience2 6.70% 0.90% -0.20% 4.70% -5.20% 0.90%
Tenure 3.90% 1.30% 0.50% 8.50% -6.20% -3.80%
Tenure2 -0.70% -1.20% -0.70% -1.80% 1.60% 1.80%
Married -0.10% -4.10% 0.10% 0.00% 0.60% 0.00%
Administrative -2.20% -0.10% 0.10% -1.70% -1.20% 0.70%
Professional 0.80% 0.50% 0.10% 0.30% 0.40% 0.00%
Semi-Professional 0.40% 0.80% 0.20% 0.30% 1.70% 0.10%
clerical 0.00% 3.30% 0.00% 0.30% 1.30% 0.20%
Board Member -1.90% 0.20% -0.20% -5.30% 2.10% -1.80%
Head of Department -0.30% -0.20% 0.10% -1.30% 0.80% -0.30%
Deputy Department 
Head 
0.10% -0.50% 0.00% 0.30% -0.30% 0.00%
Section chief 0.00% 0.10% 0.00% 0.80% -0.20% 0.00%
Deputy Section chief 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.70% 0.00% 0.00%
Team Lead 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.30% 0.00%
group Leader 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
License 0.00% -0.80% 0.00% 0.70% 0.80% -0.30%
Daily/Weekly Pay 0.00% -0.20% -0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Monthly Pay 0.00% -2.10% 0.00% -0.20% 4.90% -0.10%
Yearly Pay -0.70% -0.30% 0.10% 0.00% -0.10% 0.00%
Efficiency Pay 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% -0.30% 3.50% -0.10%
Labor Union 1.00% -0.60% -1.30% 3.60% -0.40% -1.50%
constant 0.00% -14.60% 0.00% 0.00% -9.60% 0.00%
Total 1.30% 5.10% -1.80% 7.60% 21.50% -5.40%
Large/Small & Medium Firms Wage gap (T)=E+c+cE
Wage difference between large and small-me-
dium firms(T)
4.60% 23.70%
% Total (T=100) 100 100
% Explained (E/T) 28 32
% Unexplained ((c+cE)/T) 72 68
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The total endowment effect surged in 2004, mainly due to the contribution 
of the tenure factor (+13.6% of the total endowment effect of 15.5%). The 
effect of a union was -6.8% in 1996, and this effect increased to +2.1% in 
2004, contributing to increasing the composition effect. compared to the 
endowment effect, the price effect,  and the interaction effect do not account 
the size-wage gap to a considerable extent. These results show that manual 
workers at large firms gain relative benefits from longer tenure and higher 
union rate, implicating the persistence of the internal labor market policies in 
that group. 
on the other hand, the result  non-manual workers presented in <Table 
4> illustrates drastically different outcomes. The average size-wage gap for 
white-collar workers was as low as 4.6% in 1996 but it swelled to 23.7% in 
2004. In terms of relative contribution, 28% of the gap was accounted by 
the compositional difference between the two groups in that year. In 2004, 
the endowment effect accounted for 32% of the wage gap. That is, despite 
the surge in the size-wage gap, the proportion of endowment effect did not 
change much, contrary to the case of manual workers. Instead, the Price effect 
constituted high percentages in both 1996 and 2004.
It is important to note the change in the contribution of education and 
work experience to the price effect. Education was the most important factor 
to constitute the price effect in 1996 but not in 2004. Instead, the importance 
of work experience notably increased in 2004. For nonmanual workers, the 
tendency of large firms paying more for the same level of education explained 
a great part of the size-wage gap in 1996, but now it is the work experience 
that is more rewarded in large firms, thus contributes to increasing size-wage 
gap. 
These changes can be compared with the recent finding of an increase 
in the number of experienced workers among white-collar workers at large 
firms. According to a job moving study by Kim et al. (2008), after the late 
1990s, the percentage of workers following the occupational career path 
(workers whose years of work in the same occupation is longer than their 
firm tenure) has continued to increase among professional and semi-
professional workers, whereas in the manual labor field, the percentage is 
decreasing. Especially in large firms, the proportion of new recruits entering 
at the high-rank positions is increasing. This indicates that the internal labor 
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market, which was a hindrance to white-collar workers wanting to change 
jobs, is weakening. granting that workers’ movement crossing the firm 
boundary becomes so common, what does it mean that the return to work 
experience (not firm tenure) increased more rapidly in large firms? And 
what does it mean that it became an important cause of increasing size-wage 
gap  for white-collar workers? one possible answer, among many, may be 
that workers with high productivity are moved to and concentrated in large 
firms. If this is the case, one may argue that the increase of the size-wage gap 
is a consequence workers in large firms being paid more for the same years 
of experience compared to their counterparts in SMEs due to unobserved 
productivity gaps. This means that as the boundary of corporations are 
weakened and individualized merit-based compensation becomes widespread 
for white-collar workers, skilled individuals will flock to larger firms and 
contribute even more to the pay difference between large firms and SMEs.
In summary, after the economic crisis, the internal labor market changed 
significantly, but the ways in which it changed differ greatly  between the 
manual and non-manual fields. The results of this study are supportive of 
the hypothesis that while, for manual workers, the boundary of the internal 
labor market was reduced to  the core group of long-tenured workers, for 
non-manual workers, the internal labor market has noticeably weakened. It is 
important to understand that these differing structural changes in the internal 
labor market all contributed to the widening of the wage gap between large 
firms and SMEs. And they did through different mechanisms for manual 
and nonmanual groups; through the increased proportion of long-tenured 
workers for the former and through the reshuffling of workers by ability for 
the latter. 
VII. SUMMARY AND IMPLIcATIoNS
This research analyzed the wage gap between large firms and SMEs and its 
trend over time since early 1980s. Two important points were noted. First, 
there were two historic moments that contributed greatly to the increase 
ofgap between large firms and SMEs in Korea, the 1987 general strike and 
the 1997 economic crisis, triggering different mechanisms. The size-wage 
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gap increase after 1987 was only a temporary phenomenon occurring during 
the process in which SMEs slowly caught up the pay increase initiated in 
large firms. on the other hand, the increase of the size-wage gap after 1997 
is a consequence of more diverse factors implicating more or less structural 
changes of the labor market. 
Another notable finding is that  the cause of the size-wage gap after the 
economic crisis became quite different between manual and non-manual 
male workers. In the case of manual workers, the increasing compositional 
differences between large firms and SMEs contributed most to the increase in 
disparity, while non-manual workers affected more from the increase in price 
difference. If manual workers of large firms collect greater wages than their 
counterparts in SMEs due to their higher tenure, non-manual workers of large 
firms receive higher wages due to greater compensation for work experience. 
The result for manual workers in large firms entails the persistence of the 
internal labor market characterized by higher wages secured through firm 
tenure,  whereas the result for non-manual workers in large firms shows the 
increased importance of the return to the work experience (not the firm 
tenure) implicating a development of more individualized “boundaryless 
career.” 
The research started with a question whether the internal labor market in 
Korea is being strengthened or dismantled. The answer is different depends 
on who we refer to. The corporate internal labor market still seems to be 
around in large firms for manual workers  but not for nonmanual workers. 
Not only has the seniority effect been weakened in large firms, the focus of 
hiring and wage determination has shifted to external work experience. What 
generated such different developments  is a question that should be answered 
in future studies. What this study emphasizes is the limitation of those 
perspectives to view the change in the internal labor market as a uniform 
process, whether it be the selective preservation or the complete collapse, and 
the possibility of dual process in which different structural changes occur 
simultaneously in different sectors. 
This study’s findings have implications for the recent increase in inequality 
in  Korean society. According to previous studies by Kim and Han (2007), 
Korean society, since the economic crisis, has been experiencing greater 
within-class inequality than between-class inequality. Based on the result of 
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this study, one may reckon that such within-class inequality is caused mainly 
by the advantages from belonging to internal labor market(organizational 
assets) in case of blue-collar workers, whereas in the case of white-collar 
workers, it is caused mainly by the expertise coming from formal educational 
and job experience(knowledge assets). 
Finally, the findings of this study are limited by the limits of the data. The 
“Basic Survey of Wage Structure” used in this research focuses on regular 
employees. Therefore, the gap created by employment status could not be 
considered. However, in order to investigate the long-term size-wage gap, 
the “Basic Survey of Wage Structure” was an inevitable choice despite its 
restrictions. Thus, the limitations of these data should be resolved through 
comparison with other data. Also, this study is limited in that it only focuses 
on male workers. How the dual structural changes that occurred in manual 
and nonmanualsectors after the economic crisis affected the wage gap 
between male and female workers, as well as the inequality within female 
workers are questions that require further research, through which a greater 
understanding of the structural changes in the Korean internal labor market 
will be gained. 
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